Using an estimated structural macro-…nance term structure model, we identify stylised facts in the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and the evolution of yields and yield premia over 40 years of U.S. data. The model is set up to allow us to study the implications for bond yields and term premia of imperfect credibility with respect to the objective of the Federal Reserve. Monetary policy appears to be the main determinant of the evolution of risk premia on long-term nominal bonds, through changes in agents'perceptions of the Fed's in ‡ation target. Any increase in the target, which needs to be …l-tered by economic agents, is slowly and persistently re ‡ected into an increase of the 10-year premium. At higher frequencies, shocks to the output gap account for counter-cyclical variation in term premia. Estimated premia are therefore highest during the early 80's recession, which took place when the disin ‡ation-ary process was not yet completed. We also …nd that while imperfect policy credibility can go some way towards explaining the failure of the expectations hypothesis, time-varying premia are much more important in this regard.
Introduction
Why were long-term interest rates stubbornly high during the Volcker disin ‡ation in the early 1980s? Was the low level of interest rates in recent years really a "conundrum"? Why is the behaviour of yields invariably found to be inconsistent with the expectations hypothesis (EH) of the term structure of interest rates? Informal
We would like to thank seminar participants at the BIS for helpful comments and suggestions. The opinions expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the Bank for International Settlements or the European Central Bank. answers to these questions often refer to movements in risk premia, but …nance models of risk premia have a hard time relating these to the macroeconomy and monetary policy. At the same time, microfounded macro models do poorly in terms of generating premia capable of explaining observed movements in yield data.
In this paper, the aim is to identify time-invariant relationships between risk premia and the macroeconomy based on an empirically ‡exible structure with a number of structural features that allow us to provide macroeconomic interpretations for our results. In order to constrain our estimates, we ask our model to …t not only yield data, but also the dynamics of in ‡ation and output, as well as survey information on in ‡ation and interest rate expectations. We then estimate the model over 40 years of U.S. data and look for stylised facts in the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and the evolution of bond yields and associated term premia. Moreover, the model we use allows us to examine the implications for bond yields and term premia from a monetary policy where the objective of the central bank is either unknown or not fully credible.
One of our main results highlights monetary policy as a key determinant of the evolution of risk premia in long-term nominal bond yields. We …nd that the most pronounced low-frequency variation in risk premia is ultimately due to changes in agents' perceptions of the in ‡ation target of the Federal Reserve. On average, an increase in the perceived target results in an almost one-to-one increase in the 10-year term premium, and this e¤ect turns out to be extremely persistent. At the same time, as already emphasised elsewhere, term premia display counter-cyclical variability at higher frequencies. In line with this, our estimated premia are highest during the early 80's recession, which took place when the disin ‡ationary process
was not yet completed and in ‡ation expectations remained elevated.
Examining the implications of our model for the EH of the term structure of interest rates, we …nd that when private agents learn about the objective of the central bank due to this being unknown or not credible this is helpful in explaining part of the observed empirical failures of the EH (the "expectations puzzle"). However, learning alone is not su¢ cient to account for more than a fraction of these failures, implying that time-varying premia would need to do most of the job in this regard. We …nd that our model, which does allow for ‡exible premia, is capable of fully explaining the expectations puzzle simply by appropriately choosing the market-price-of-risk parameters, while holding all other parameters …xed at their maximum likelihood values.
Our answer to the questions listed at the beginning of this section would therefore con…rm the importance of time-varying risk premia in understanding long-term interest rates dynamics. Yields were stubbornly high during the Volcker disin ‡a-tion not only because in ‡ation expectations were slow to adjust downwards, but also because risk premia remained sizeable due to perceptions of a high in ‡ation target. The regained monetary stability of the subsequent period was only slowly incorporated into a fall in the perceived in ‡ation target. At the beginning of the new millennium, a stable and low perceived in ‡ation target was largely responsible for the persistently negligible risk premia, which could be seen as a "conundrum" when compared to the experiences of the 1980s and 1990s. These swings in premia, combined with the e¤ects of agents learning about the Fed's objective, also go some way in explaining why the behaviour of bond yields are typically inconsistent with the EH.
Our work is related to many other papers examining the dynamics of long term interest rates and the performance of the EH. Other papers have emphasised the role of time-variation in the structure of the economy or of the monetary policy "rule" followed by the Fed as an explanation for the failure of the EH (e.g. Fuhrer, 1996; Favero and Milani, 2005; Rudebusch, 1995) . The link between long-term yields and misperceptions of the in ‡ation target has also been explored by Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) , Kozicki and Tinsley (2001 , 2005a , 2005b and, more recently, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) . The formulation we adopt is closer to that in Erceg and Levin (2003) , where the target is assumed to be persistent, but stationary.
None of these papers, however, allows for time-variations in risk premia.
One of our contributions is therefore to present evidence from an estimated structural model that allows term premia to vary over time in a way that is consistent with the dynamics of the macroeconomy while at the same time precluding arbitrage opportunities in the bond market. Our approach is to rely on an a¢ ne framework including macroeconomic factors, as pioneered by Ang and Piazzesi (2003 and interpret movements in yields as well as premia in terms of macroeconomic fundamentals and perceptions about monetary policy. One of the innovations in this paper is that we study explicitly the e¤ects of allowing private agents to learn about the central bank's objective.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the underlying macroeconomic model and how bonds are priced consistent with the macro dynamics and with no-arbitrage restrictions. Section 3 discusses the estimation method and the data that we use. The estimation results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 looks in more detail at responses of yields and term premia to macroeconomic shocks. Section 6 focuses on the implications of our estimated model for the expectations hypothesis. Section 7 concludes.
The model
We model the economy using a basic New Keynesian structural model for the output gap, in ‡ation, and the short-term nominal interest, namely:
where the in ‡ation target is assumed to be p;t = p p;t 1 + " p;t and ;t = ;t 1 + " ;t x;t = x x;t 1 + " x;t ;
while the monetary policy shock q;t is assumed to be white noise. Equation (1) describes a new Keynesian Phillips curve, equation (2) is a new Keynesian IS curve and equation (3) describes the central bank reaction function as a Taylor-type rule for the short-term interest rate. 2 Equations (1) and (2) can in principle be derived 2 In ‡ation and the output gap are modelled in deviation from the steady state (assumed to be 3% annualised and 0, respectively).
from the log-linearization of the optimality conditions of households'and monopolistically competitive …rms in a structural microfounded model. More speci…cally, the presence of lagged terms in the Phillips and IS curves can be motivated by some rule-of-thumb price-setters and by habits in consumption, respectively. However, the microfoundations of the model are not exploited further in the rest of our analysis.
When pricing nominal bonds, we do not exploit a microfounded stochastic discount factor, but rely instead on the more ‡exible speci…cation used in essentiallya¢ ne …nance models (Du¤ee, 2002) . This speci…cation can be interpreted in various ways. For example, it could be seen as the unrestricted version of the a¢ ne link between prices of risk and state variables which would emerge in a third-order approximation of a microfounded new Keynesian model (see Ravenna and Seppälä, 2006) . Alternatively, equations (1) and (2) could be interpreted as the aggregate relations which describe a model with heterogenous agents. In this case, a (possibly non-unique) stochastic discount factor would still exists, but it would not obey the restrictions implied by representative-agent models with standard utility functions.
In any case, we rely on the chosen ‡exible form for the discount factor to give the model a better chance to capture key features of observed yield data.
For the policy rule, we assume the formulation in equation (3) throughout our estimation sample, which starts in 1967. 3 This is often argued to be a reasonable characterisation of the Federal Reserve policy even for the brief period of reserves targeting at the start of the Volcker era. 4 Some authors, notably Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) , have argued that the start of the Volcker era also signed a structural change in US monetary policy, which resulted in a much stronger antiin ‡ation determination of the Federal Reserve. Such a shift could have manifested itself in an increase of the in ‡ation reaction coe¢ cient ( in our notation above) in a simple Taylor rule characterisation of monetary policy. Here, however, we propose a di¤erent interpretation of Federal Reserve behaviour. We maintain …xed the Taylor rule parameters, but allow for smooth changes in the in ‡ation target p;t . A lower anti-in ‡ationary determination would therefore be captured by an upward drift of the target in our formulation. 5 In our empirical investigation, we do not estimate 3 According to Fuhrer (1996) , "since 1966, understanding the behaviour of the short rate has been equivalent to understanding the behaviour of the Fed, which has since that time essentially set the federal Funds rate at a target level, in response to movements in in ‡ation and real activity". See also Bernanke and Mihov (1998) . 4 Goodfriend (1991) argues that even under the period of o¢ cial reserves targeting, the Federal Reserve had in mind an implicit target for the Funds rate. 5 The target is also expressed in deviation from its steady state, which is assumed to correspond the parameter p , but we simply assume that the target is a near-random walk, and set p = 0:99. In ‡ation and output shocks, ;t and x;t , are assumed to be serially correlated. All shocks are mutually uncorrelated.
A model similar to the one outlined above is common in the macroeconomic literature (see e.g. Smets, 2003) and has already been employed in the macro…nance literature. In these contributions, however, it is typically assumed that the in ‡ation target is known to private agents when they formulate their expectations of future output and in ‡ation and when they price nominal bonds. As argued by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) and Erceg and Levin (2003) , this assumption does not appear to be consistent with survey data on long term in ‡ation expectations. We therefore follow Erceg and Levin (2003) and assume that private agents know the structure of the economy as well as all the parameters, and that they consequently can infer the shocks ;t and x;t from the observation of t , x t , and r t . However, they can only observe the linear combination (1 ) p;t + q;t of the target and the policy shock, not the individual components. They therefore need to solve a …ltering problem to infer the current values of the in ‡ation target, which is necessary to form expectations about future in ‡ation, future policy rates and current bond yields. More speci…cally, agents will base their decisions on the perceived policy rule
where hats denote …ltered values of the corresponding variables, which agents will obtain using the Kalman …lter based on the available information.
Model solution and bond prices
The macro model has a state-space representation such that
where X 1;t = h x t 1 ; t 1 ;^ p;tjt ;^ q;tjt ; ;t ; x;t ; r t 1 i 0 is the vector of predetermined variables of the model, the vector of nonpredetermined variables is X 2t = [x t ; t ] 0 and the policy rule is written in feedback form from the other variables as r t = G 0 1 X 1;t + G 0 2 X 2;t . Solving the model using standard numerical methods (we use to the steady state of in ‡ation.
the methodology described in Söderlind (1999) based on the Schur decomposition) yields
Given that the short rate is linear in the predetermined state vector X 1;t ; and that the law of motion of this vector is a¢ ne, we can proceed to price bonds by means of the a¢ ne term structure approach used in the …nance literature (see e.g.
Du¢ e and Kan, 1996 or Dai and Singleton, 2000) . First, however, we need to impose the assumption of absence of arbitrage opportunities and specify a process for the stochastic discount factor. We choose a standard speci…cation for the stochastic discount factor (with a log-normal Radon-Nikodym derivative), and assume that the market prices of risk are a¢ ne in the predetermined state vector X 1;t ; This implies that market prices of risk are allowed to vary with the levels of all shocks, and that term premia will depend on the variances of the shocks.
Under this structure, bond prices will be exponential a¢ ne functions of the X 1;t
where the coe¢ cients A n and B 0 n are de…ned recursively as
where is the covariance matrix of the state variables, and where the recursion starts from A 1 = 0 and B 1 = : The yield on an n-period zero-coupon bond is thus given by
3 Estimation methodology and data
The model likelihood function can be constructed using the Kalman …lter (see the Appendix). In the estimation, we introduce a measurement error vector w t of serially uncorrelated shocks. Given the large number of parameters involved in the estimation, however, we do not directly maximise the likelihood, but we introduce priors and proceed by relying on Bayesian estimation methods. Speci…cally, we maximise the posterior density function obtained by combining the log-likelihood function with the prior density for the model parameters. An advantage of such an approach is that it allows us to exploit prior information on structural economic relationships available from previous studies. Moreover, the inclusion of prior distributions brings an added advantage in that it tends to make the optimisation of the highly nonlinear estimation problem more stable.
Our assumptions regarding the prior distribution of the macro parameters, which are guided by previous empirical results, are listed in Table 1 . For the parameters that determine the market prices of risk (the elements in 0 and 1 ) we assume normal priors centered at zero with very large standard errors, re ‡ecting our lack of prior information regarding these parameters. We proceed to …nd the mode of the posterior density using the simulated annealing algorithm (see Go¤e, Ferrier and Rogers, 1994) and simulate the posterior by drawing from a distribution centered at the mode using the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm (see An and Schorfheide, 2007) . 6 We estimate the model using quarterly data on zero-coupon Treasury yields, expected annual CPI in ‡ation rate during the coming year expected average CPI in ‡ation rate over the next 10 years expected 3-month T-bill rate, two quarters ahead expected 3-month T-bill rate, four quarters ahead 6 The estimations were performed using modi…ed versions of Frank schorfheide's Gauss code for Bayesian estimation of DSGE models.
His original code is available at http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~schorf/ The sample period is Q2:1967 to Q4:2007 (survey data is not available for all dates, and enter in the estimations when they are available).
Estimation results
In this section we discuss the results of our estimation of the model outlined in section 2. Table 1 
Risk premia
Actual and EH-consistent 10-year yields implied by the model are displayed in Figure   2 . The generally positive di¤erence between actual and EH yields suggests that term premia almost always tend to be positive. However, it is also clear that the two series are quite close to each other, on average, until the end of the seventies.
As of 1980, however, the two series become persistently di¤erent, presumably due to a sharp increase in risk premia, and it is only in the new millennium that the di¤erence narrows markedly again. As of around 2003, actual and EH-consistent 10-year yields have tended to be extremely similar to each other, suggesting that term premia have nearly vanished in recent years.
In principle, the di¤erence between the actual and the model-implied EHconsistent yields could be partly due to other factors than a term premium. For example, the model might do a poor job in capturing actual yield movements, thus resulting in large and possibly persistent measurement errors. However, as is clear from Figure 3 , the measurement error implied by the model estimates remains negligible throughout the sample. In other words, the estimated model-implied 10-year term premium displayed in Figure 3 almost fully accounts for the di¤erence between actual and EH-consistent yields (the same is true for other maturities). This premium (at maturity n) is given by 
The response of premia to macroeconomic shocks
To gain some further insight into the driving forces behind the dynamics of term premia, it is useful to examine impulse-responses of premia to macroeconomic shocks.
Obtaining such responses for output and in ‡ation shocks is straightforward. For policy shocks and target shocks, however, we take into account that the true in ‡ation target is not known to private agents, so that they need to disentangle it from policy shocks when they observe a deviation from the systematic component of the policy rule. Hence, standard impulse-responses produce estimates of the perceived shocks, not the actual shocks. When computing impulse-responses to a true target shock, we need to take agents'…ltering process into account.
In so doing, we use the fact that private agents can only observe the linear combination t (1 ) pt + qt of the target and the policy shock. To disentangle the two components, they rely on the Kalman …lter (see also Erceg and Levin, 2003 At the same time, we need to take into account that the central bank knows the true value of the shocks. We do this through a modi…cation of the state vector.
More speci…cally, we add the perceived target and policy shock to the vector X 1t to obtain the expanded state vector X 1;t = h x t 1 ; t 1 ; p;t ; q;t ; " ;t ; " x;t ; r t 1 ;^ p;tjt ;^ q;tjt i 0 :
so that the model solution will need to be modi…ed accordingly, resulting iñ X 1;t+1 =MX 1;t +ũ 1;t+1 ;
For the law of motion ofX 1;t ; the columns of the endogenous variables (except the interest rate) corresponding to p;t and q;t are shifted to^ p;tjt and^ q;tjt ; i.e.
to the last two columns (i.e. this concerns the …rst two rows of M). The matrixC is simply constructed by adding the columns in C corresponding to p;t and q;t to the rightmost position, and setting these original columns to zero. We concentrate on responses to in ‡ation target and output gap shocks. Figure   6 displays a one standard deviation (8 basis points) increase in the target, which implies an immediate increase in the actual target followed by a very slow reversion to the steady state. The private sector's perceptions, however, adjust much more slowly, as much of the increase is initially mistaken for a policy shock. As a result, long-term rates remain almost unchanged on impact ( Figure 7 ). Over time, however, the target shock is progressively recognised as such and yields start increasing, up to a maximum of around 12 basis points after 10 years. Approximately a third of this increase is due to an increase in the 10-year term premium, which eventually increases up to around 4 basis points. If we instead assume that the central bank's in ‡ation target is fully known and credible among private sector agents, an upward shock to the target (same size as before) would result in an immediate jump in 10-year yields of almost 30 basis points ( Figure 8 ). Around 12 basis points of this response would be due to an increase in the premium, while the remained would re ‡ect expectations of higher average short rates. Mirroring the response of the actual target in Graph 6, the e¤ects on yields and premia would slowly dissipate following the initial jump. It is worth noting that in a situation when the in ‡ation target is unknown or not fully credible, the responses in Figure 8 also correspond to those from a shock to the perceived target of the same size as the assumed shock to the true target. Compared to the responses to a target shock, a one standard deviation increase in the output gap generates a much larger impact response of 10-year yields, as displayed in Figure 9 . However, the e¤ects are much less persistent, and yields quickly revert to the baseline after around two years. Strikingly, while policy interest rates increase after the shock together with the output gap and in ‡ation, 10-year yields fall. The yields response is almost entirely shaped by changes in risk premia.
Because of an increase in investors' willingness to take on risk during economic booms, premia fall after the shock. This is su¢ cient to drive down long term rates, which would remain almost unchanged under the expectations hypothesis because of the short-lived nature of the shock. 7 The impulse-responses presented above imply that when an upward shock to the perceived in ‡ation target occurs simultaneously with a downward shock to the output gap, the result is a sharp rise in yields as both the persistent and the cyclical components of term premia are pushed higher. As mentioned before, the combination of a recession and gradually shifting perceptions about the Fed's willingness to combat high in ‡ation was therefore a key driver of the jump in estimated bond premia in the early 1980's. Although the upward pressure on premia from the recession gradually eased as the economy began to recover, the e¤ects due to changed perceptions about the in ‡ation target took much longer to dissipate, thus resulting in stubbornly high bond yields through much of the 80's and 90's. Empirical estimates of the Campbell-Shiller long-rate coe¢ cients n in y n 1 t+1 y n t = 0 + n (y n t r t ) = (n 1), and 95 percent con…dence bands based on HAC standard errors computed according to Hodrick (1992) .
According to the EH, a positive spread between the yield on an n-period zerocoupon bond and the short rate predicts an increase in the n-period bond yield.
Speci…cally, the EH prescribes that the projection of the yield change y n 1 t+1 y n t on the scaled yield spread (y n t r t ) = (n 1) should yield a coe¢ cient of 1. Empirical tests have, however, overwhelmingly rejected this implication of the theory and, in fact, found a negative relationship, as documented by Campbell and Shiller (1991) and a large number of subsequent papers. We con…rm this expectations puzzle using our yield data set: except for the very shortest maturities n; the estimated CampbellShiller slope parameters are negative and statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from one The results in Figure 11 show that we have some success in matching the empirical slope parameters, in particular for short and intermediate maturities.
The features of our model, including time-varying risk premia and imperfect policy credibility, therefore appear to go some of the way in explaining the expectations puzzle.
However, it is also clear that the model does not fully explain the puzzle, especially for long maturities. Why is this? We performed an experiment to show that it is not because the model is inherently incapable of matching the empirical parameters. Speci…cally, we …xed all the macro parameters and reestimated only the market price of risk parameters while including the distance between the model-implied and the empirical Campbell-Shiller parameters as an added criterion to be minimised. 8 The results showed that we were able to fully match the empirical parameters by only tweaking the price of risk parameters and keeping the macro dynamics unchanged. This experiment therefore highlights the importance of time-varying risk premia in explaining the expectations puzzle. What role does imperfect policy credibility play with respect to the failure of the EH? To investigate this, we conduct two experiments. First, keeping the macro parameters unchanged, we set all price of risk parameters to zero and proceed to simulate a very long sequence (one million periods) of yields under the assumption of full information, on which we then run the Campbell-Shiller regressions. As could be expected, we recover a parameter of one across all maturities (the solid line in Figure 12 ). Next, we repeat the experiment, again with zero prices of risk, but instead of imposing full information, we assume imperfect policy credibility. The solid line plots the (population) implied Campbell-Shiller longrate paramteres n when the expectations hypothesis has been imposed and when full information is assumed. The parameters plotted with the dashed line are obtained when the full-information assumption is dropped, but the expectations hypothesis remains imposed. The dots correspond to the parameters implied by the estimated (unrestricted) model.
Interestingly, the e¤ect is to push the Campbell-Shiller parameters down from one to around 0:6 0:7 (the dashed line in Figure 12 ). 9 This shows that imperfect credibility, and the associated learning process of private agents, contributes to producing yield dynamics that result in Campbell-Shiller parameters below one. At the same time, the experiment also makes it clear that estimated premia are more important than imperfect policy credibility in terms of producing the model-implied parameters (the dots in Figure 12 ). Moreover, taking the macro dynamics as given, the only way the empirical parameters can be fully explained is through time-varying risk premia, as discussed above.
Conclusions
We use an estimated structural macro-…nance term structure model to identify stylised facts in the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and the evolution of yields and yield premia over 40 years of U.S. data. We set up our model in a way that allows us to study the implications for bond yields and term premia of imperfect credibility with respect to the objective of the Federal Reserve. The model does very well in capturing movements in bond yields over the sample period, including puzzling episodes such as the very high yields of the 1980's and the low yields in recent years (Greenspan's "conundrum"), thanks in large part to risk premia.
Our results show that monetary policy appears to be the main determinant of the evolution of risk premia on long-term nominal bonds, through changes in agents'
perceptions of the Fed's in ‡ation target. Any increase in the target, which needs to be …ltered by economic agents, is slowly and persistently re ‡ected into an increase of the 10-year premium. At higher frequencies, shocks to the output gap account for counter-cyclical variation in term premia. Estimated premia are therefore highest during the early 80's recession, which took place when the disin ‡ationary process
was not yet completed. We also …nd that while imperfect policy credibility can go some way towards explaining the failure of the expectations hypothesis, time-varying premia are much more important in this regard.
Our results highlight one particular consequence of eroding credibility of monetary policy, namely high …nancing costs for consumers, …rms and governments as a result of high risk premia. Moreover, once credibility is lost or damaged, the process of regaining it will be protracted, implying that costs associated with high risk premia (among other costs) can be reduced only slowly. This is a result worth keeping in mind in today's environment of near-zero policy rates, unconventional monetary expansion schemes and record …scal stimulus packages.
A Appendix: Model estimation with the Kalman …lter and noting that the interest rate and in ‡ation expectations re ‡ected in the survey data can be written as suitable linear functions of the states:
we can proceed to de…ne the observation equation as where F selects the sub-matrix of M corresponding to X u 1 : Next, the unobservable variables are estimated using the Kalman …lter. In doing so, we …rst introduce a vector w t of serially uncorrelated measurement errors corresponding to the observable variables W t . Letting R denote the variance-covariance matrix of the measurement errors and Q the variances of the unobservable state variables X u 1;t ; we have While we assume that all observable variables are subject to measurement error, we limit the number of parameters to estimate by assuming that all yield measurement errors have identical variance, and that all errors are mutually uncorrelated: R = (see Hamilton, 1994 
